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Are Law and Morality Distinct? 
William A. Edmundson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relation of law and morality is difficult to define, but is of 
great importance. The relation is often treated as a conceptual one, and 
discussion of it raises troubling issues such as whether the law can ever 
require what is morally repugnant, or whether there is any moral re-
quirement to obey the law simply because it is the law. These concep-
tual issues are important, but are separable from the one I want to 
explore here, which is whether there can be valid moral requirements 
that cannot validly be made requirements of law. The issue I want to 
examine is not so much one about what "law" and "morality" mean as 
it is about turf - is there (can there be) any department of conduct 
that morality claims as exclusively its own, and which the law has no 
business penetrating? The view that there are some moral wrongs that 
the law cannot properly right is tacitly and sometimes explicitly as-
sumed by many participants in the ever-intensifying debate about 
privacy. 1 
In what follows I will use the term "strongly delegalized moral 
requirements" to refer to the putative class of moral requirements that 
are forbidden by morality itself to become legal requirements. Some 
moral requirements may be only "weakly" delegalized because the 
moral requirements that "delegalize" them do so only contingently. For 
example, utilitarian moral concerns might delegalize a certain moral 
requirement if the social costs of legal enforcement outweighed the ben-
efits. In such a case, the requirement in question would be delegalized 
but only weakly so, because a shift in the balance of costs and benefits 
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Mississippi School of Law. Antioch College, 
B.A.; University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D.; Duke University, J.D. Thanks are due to James 
Peterman and Michael Hoffheimer, for their suggestions, and to Bonnie Steinbock and Ferdie 
Schoenman, for their provocations. Each is blameless for my errors. 
I. The landmarks of the constitutional progress of this debate are Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) and Bowers v Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For recent discussion of the underlying 
issues, see Symposium, Law, Community, and Moral Reasoning, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 475 (1989). 
For a vivid characterization of competing viewpoints and the breadth of issues at stake, see P. 
Carrington, A Senate of Five: An Essay on Sexuality and the Law, 23 GA. L. REV. 859 (1989). 
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is always possible and would remove the barrier of delegalization. 
Strongly delegalized moral requirements, on the other hand, are those 
whose delegalization is a matter of principle, rather than of policy. 2 
Liberals and libertarians have a forensic if not a theoretical stake 
in defending the view that strongly delegalized moral requirements ex-
ist. Liberalism holds that individual liberty is a paramount value, and 
that legal curtailment of an individual's liberty to act. is morally justi-
fied only if her conduct might cause harm to others, or produce unde-
sirable consequences of other kinds. A liberal need not claim that dele-
galized moral requirements exist, or are possible, for a liberal might 
hold that nothing can be a moral requirement unless harm to others, or 
some other consequentialist concern, so warrants. A liberal might, in 
other words, hold what Joel Feinberg calls a "perfect coincidence" 
view, according to which something like a Millian harm principle de-
fines the territory of both the moral and the permissibly legal. 3 The 
perfect coincidence view entails that strongly delegalized moral require-
ments do not exist. 
Many liberals (but, as I point out below, not Mill himself) reject 
the perfect coincidence view. They are reluctant to claim that their 
principles circumscribe morality as well as law because to do so extends 
the territory they must defend and thus tends to diminish the overall 
2. For an elaboration of the distinction between "policy" and "principle" see R. DwoRKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 22-28, 90-100 (1977) [hereinafter TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. In 
this discussion, I will mean by "law" the set of all legal requirements (existing in one place at a 
time) and by "morality" the set of all moral requirements (existing at that place at that time). 
Legal and moral requirements are distinguishable by the fact that there are state-maintained 
mechanisms for enforcing the former, but not necessarily the latter, type of requirement. As the 
discussion in section V., infra, makes evident, membership in the category of legal requirement is 
broader than what might at first appear. The term "moral requirement" is meant roughly to 
invoke what Lon Fuller has called "the morality of duty," as contrasted to "the morality of aspira-
tion." See L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY OF LAw 5-6 (rev. ed. 1969). 
3. See J. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING at 124-25 (1988). Feinberg himself rejects 
the "perfect coincidence" view, see id. at 153-54, but many liberals do not. For example, Dworkin 
apparently does not, see TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY at 253, and Anthony Woozley certainly does 
not, see "Law and the Legislation of Morality" in ETHICS IN HARD TIMES (A. Caplan & D. 
Callahan, eds. 1981). Other authors have expressed skepticism about the general project of divid-
!ng morality into a part that may permissibly be legally enforced and a part that cannot. See 
Nagel, The Enforcement of Morals, HuMANIST, May/June 1968 at 18-27; J\1. GoLDING, PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW at 67 (1975). A point made by both Dworkin and Woozley is that counting 
something as a genuine moral requirement presupposes the existence of supporting reasons, and 
that these reasons in the absence of some bar might quite legitimately be weighed by a legislature. 
This point is not decisive, however, for the existence of such a bar remains a possibility -one 
which might be explained, e.g., in terms of Razian "exclusionary reasons." See J. RAz, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 16-17 (1979). My overall argument is designed to show that the existence of 
such a bar would be incompatible with the existence of the range of morally permissible forms of 
social enforcement which, I claim in section III, attach to any genuine moral requirement. 
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plausibility of their view. To convince a popular audience,• it is more 
effective to say, for example, that consensual sado-masochism is morally 
wrong but beyond the law's proper reach, than to say that it is morally 
permissible and therefore beyond the law's proper reach.6 Conse-
quently, some liberals (explicitly or otherwise) take the position that 
there exist strongly delegalized moral requirements, and what I would 
like to explore is the question: What account can be given of such 
requirements? 
I will argue that no one can convincingly maintain that something 
is a moral requirement unless she is willing to recognize a range of 
morally permissible measures designed to correct individual failures to 
observe that requirement. One who believes that strongly delegalized 
moral requirements are possible has to give an account not only of how 
such requirements arise and find rational support, but also of the range 
of morally permissible, nonlegal corrective measures that must be asso-
ciated with them. It is unclear how a liberal, for example, can give the 
first sort of account because such an account will have to be congenial 
to the priority of liberty and the harm principle, and yet not so conge-
nial that the requirement in question is legalizable. But even if such an 
account can be given, the liberal will find it difficult to give a plausible 
account of the contours of morally permissible, necessarily non-legal 
correction. 
In particular, I will argue that on Mill's account of social enforce-
ment a less oppressive legal corrective is always conceivable, and that 
therefore the question whether the values of individual liberty and au-
tonomy are better served by legal or by non-legal correction is always 
to be decided according to the particulars of the case. I conclude, then, 
that liberals (and everyone else) ought to accept the "perfect coinci-
dence" view. But accepting this conclusion is not costless; for, when 
4. Michael J. Sandel has recently distinguished "naive" and "sophisticated" types of argu-
ment for, or against, morals legislation. See Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: 
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (1989). According to Sandel, naive argu-
ments "hold[] that the justice of laws depends on the moral worth of the conduct they prohibit or 
protect," while sophisticated arguments "bracket" substantive moral issues and invoke "a more 
general theory about the respective claims of majority rule and individual rights .... " /d. For 
sophisticated advocates of such legislation, bracketing means letting the majority decide; for sophis-
ticated opponents, it means letting the individual decide. Each of these adversaries appeals to a 
"more general theory" to support its favored decisionmaker. One central point of the present 
article, expressed in Sandelian terms, is that the "more general theory" that sophisticated liberals 
invoke often involves an implicit or explicit denial of the perfect coincidence view. 
5. According to a recent The New York Times/CBS News Poll, 68o/o of 978 adults polled 
"say that even in cases where they might think abortion is wrong, the government has no business 
preventing a woman from having an abortion." And 35% of "those who say abortion is murder 
and never the best course, even in a bad situation [20% of all respondents]'' also say that prevent-
ing abortion is "no business" of the state. See The N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1989, at 10, col. 1. 
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specific issues of morals legislation arise, the "perfect coincidence" view 
requires those taking a liberal position to face the potentially awkward 
dilemma of having either to contradict popular moral notions or to ad-
mit that their opposition to legal enforcement is based only on grounds 
of policy, not of moral principle. 
Because Mill is such a central figure in the liberal tradition, it will 
be illuminating first to explore his view. 
II. MILL's VIEw 
The idea that there is an area of morality that is "not the law's 
business"6 is usually traced to Mill. Mill does, in the Introduction to 
On Liberty, speak of "rules of conduct ... imposed ... by opinion ... 
which are not fit subjects for the operation of law ,"7 and of "a legiti-
mate sphere of legal control"8 and to "what things are fit to be done by 
a government."9 And, in the fourth chapter, Mill distinguishes a cate-
gory of conduct which, though "hurtful to others or wanting in due 
consideration for their welfare" does not violate "any of their consti-
tuted rights," in which case "[t]he offender may then be justly punished 
by opinion, though not by law."10 These passages suggest that Mill's 
view was that delegalized -and perhaps strongly delegalized- moral 
requirements indeed exist. But Mill generally argues that the "harm" 
principle defines not only a limit beyond which law may not pass, but 
also a limit to morality, so the issue requires investigating. 
Mill divides personal faults into two categories. Members of the 
first concern the actor's "own good" but do not affect the interests of 
others, and therefore never merit social punishment although they may 
occasion the "disagreeable consequence" that others in their liberty may 
shun the actor's company, hold him in disesteem, and pass him over in 
the distribution of "optional good offices" not tending to his self-im-
provement.11 Into this category Mill places folly, "lowness or deprava-
tion of taste," rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit, immoderation, self-in-
dulgence and cupidity. 12 Mill adds that these "are not properly 
immoralities and, to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not consti-
6. This indelible phrase appears in paragraph 257 of the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (CMD 247) (1957), commonly known as the 
WoLFENDEN REPORT. 
7. jOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY at 8 (C. Shields, ed. 1956) [hereinafter ON LIBERTY]. 
8. /d. at 12. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 91-92. 
11. Id. at 94. 
12. Id. 
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tute wickedness."13 To fit Mill's claim into the terminology I am using, 
doing what is for one's own good is never per se morally required. 
Faults of the second category affect others, and are "fit objects of 
moral reprobation and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punish-
ment."14 To this category belong rights violations, unjustified injury 
and "unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over [others]; even selfish 
abstinence from defending them from injury."111 Dispositions to such 
conduct -such as cruelty, malice, envy, insincerity, irascibility, greed 
and self-conceit- are also "properly immoral and fit subjects of disap-
probation which may rise to abhorrence.m6 But nothing is "socially 
obligatory unless circumstances render [it] at the same time [a] dut[y] to 
others."17 In other words, "moral disapprobation in the proper sense of 
the term" is appropriate only where conduct "violate[s] a distinct and 
assignable obligation to any other person."18 Mill's puzzling summary 
is this: "Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a definite 
risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken 
out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law.m9 
The disjunction, "morality or law," suggests that Mill felt these 
provinces to be distinct, but he gives no indication that different princi-
ples should operate in the two provinces, and every indication that in 
each province the decision, whether to sanction conduct and to what 
degree, is governed by the answer to the general question "whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with 
it. ... "20 Mill makes it nearly certain that his view does not recognize 
strongly delegalized moral requirements, when, in the concluding chap-
ter of On Liberty, he states the maxim that: "for such actions as are 
prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and 
may be subject either to social or to legal punishment if society is of the 
opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection. " 21 
In Mill's view the choice of remedies requires a calculation and 
comparison of the expected utilities of the available means and agen-
cies. Once the harm principle justifies a sanction, Mill gives no hint 
13. /d. at 96. Although Mill believed most strenuously in the virtue of self-improvement, he 
seems uncomfortable with the terms "duties to ourselves" and "duty to oneself." See id. 
14. /d. at 95. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. 
17. /d. at 96. 
18. !d. at 99. The existence of "a distinct and assignable obligation" to another is not, for 
Mill, a necessary feature of the duties of morality in general, as distinct from the duties of justice. 
See j.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 304-05 (Warnock ed. 1962) [hereinafter UTILITARIANISM]. 
19. ON LIBERTY at 100. 
20. /d. at 92. 
21. /d. at 114 (emphasis added). 
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that any principle dictates an a priori preference for private as against 
state enforcement. Once the harm principle has been satisfied, the ques-
tion of sanction is to be settled solely on grounds of utility, "the ulti-
mate appeal on all ethical questions."22 As Mill put it in his 
"Introduction": 
If anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for 
punishing him by law or, where legal penalties are not safely appli-
cable, by general disapprobation .... In all things which regard the 
external relations of the individual, he is de jure amenable to those 
whose interests are concerned, and, if need be, to society as their pro-
tector. There are often good reasons for not holding him to the re-
sponsibility; but these reasons must arise from the special expedien-
cies of the case: either because it is a kind of case in which he is on 
the whole likely to act better when left to his own discretion than 
when controlled by any way in which society have it in their power to 
control him; or because the attempt to exercise control would produce 
other evils, greater than those which it would prevent.18 
What, in Mill's view, distinguishes legal and merely social means 
of enforcing rules of conduct? He wrote: 
Society can and does execute its own mandates [as opposed to those 
issued "by the hands of its political functionaries"]; and if it issues 
wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things 
with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more 
formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not 
usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of 
escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and 
enslaving the soul itself. 24 
The contrast Mill draws is multidimensional, but nonetheless one 
of degree. "Civil penalties" are usually (but not always) more extreme 
than those of "prevailing opinion and feeling," but the latter are much 
harder to elude, much more minutely pervasive and are much more 
corrosive of individual personality.211 No wonder that Mill repeatedly 
announces that he intends his "one very simple principle" to set a limit 
to both legal and social control of the individuai.26 
Strongly delegalized moral requirements seem possible because the 
characteristics of being a legal requirement and of being a merely 
22. /d. at 14. 
23. /d. at 15 (emphasis added). Cf UTILITARIANISM at 303. 
24. ON LIBERTY at 7 (emphasis added). 
25. /d. 
26. /d. at 13. 
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moral requirement differ.27 Legal requirements are coercively 
enforceable by some state-regulated mechanism; merely moral require-
ments are not necessarily coercively enforceable, although some proba-
bly are. It may be helpful to make two distinctions explicit. Any re-
quirement of conduct may permissibly be enforced either through solely 
suasive (i.e., sub-coercive) means, or through coercive means such as 
physical compulsion and threats thereof.28 This is a distinction between 
permissible means of enforcement, and it corresponds roughly to what 
Mill had in mind when he distinguished civil penalties and punishment 
"by opinion." Further, any requirement of conduct may be enforced 
privately only, or it may be enforced by the state. This is a distinction 
between permissible agents of enforcement, and it is one to which Mill 
gave less attention, for he felt that society had come in either case to be 
the ultimate agent of enforcement. 
The two distinctions cut across each other and, for any require-
ment of conduct, create four possibilities: A requirement may be pri-
vately suasively enforceable, suasively enforceable by the state, privately 
coercively enforceable, or coercively enforceable by the state. A further 
division within the category of the state's coercive means must be noted, 
viz., between regulatory and criminal coercive measures. A map of the 








27. According to Louis Schwartz, co-author, with Herbert Wechsler, of the MoDEL PENAL 
ConE OF THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, "Moral demands on human behavior can be higher 
than those of the criminal law precisely because violations of those higher standards do not carry 
the grave consequences of penal offenses." Schwartz' observation pertained to the ALI's recom-
mendation on abortion, and he went on to remark that, "Moreover, moral standards in this area 
are in a state of flux, with wide disagreement among honest and reasonable people." Schwartz, 
Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 685 (1963) (citing MonEL 
PENAL ConE § 207.11, comment 1 at 150-51 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)). Schwartz' latter remark 
undermines the assumption implicit in the former that a genuine moral demand is at issue. 
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In section III, following, I will argue that nothing can be a moral 
requirement unless it can be located somewhere in this matrix. In sec-
tion IV, I will try to show that it is implausible that the state should be 
barred by moral principle from employing the means of enforcement 
available to private actors. This is, I think, readily shown where coer-
cive means are privately available. Where the only privately available 
means of enforcement are suasive, however, complications arise. These 
have to do with the fact that the state often cannot occupy the special 
roles whose occupants are in many instances the only morally allowable 
voices of suasion and complaint, and have also to do with the fact that 
in any event the state seldom confines itself to purely suasive means. 
Therefore, in section V, I try to show that from a Millian standpoint 
the moral grounds that justify private suasive enforcement also justify 
some form of state regulatory enforcement. In section VI, I will argue 
that regulatory and criminal enforcement cannot be distinguished in 
any way that would enable one to hold that there are moral require-
ments which the state may enforce by regulation but not by 
criminalization. 
III. ARE UNENFORCEABLE MoRAL REQUIREMENTS PossiBLE? 
It is typically true of moral requirements that transgressions will 
create in some other person a grievance; but this is not always true.29 
Invariably, however, a moral requirement incumbent on a given person 
carries with it a moral permission of some sort, on someone's part, to 
persuade that person to comply, and also carries with it a moral per-
mission on someone's part to remonstrate if the requirement is not ob-
served. If some such morally permissible persuasion and chastisement 
were not carried along, I think it would be false to suppose that the 
relevant moral requirement existed.30 
28. For the sake of simplicity of exposition I have assumed that "coerc:on" and "suasion" are 
distinguishable by reference to the presence or absence of a threat of some sort of physical compul-
sion. This assumption certainly requires more elaboration and defense than I am able to give here, 
but it will be sufficient for present purposes. 
29. Mill noted the use of the terms "perfect" and "imperfect" to distinguish between duties 
that do and duties that do not entail a correlative individual right to compel performance. See 
UTILITARIANISM at 305. Derek Parfit, in his REASONS AND PERSONS 357-61 (1984) sets out a 
now-famous example of a wrong giving rise to no grievance. A couple know that if they have a 
child now there is a risk that it will have a defect, but that the risk will pass if they wait. The 
couple decide to have a child now rather than wait, or are careless then decide not to induce an 
abortion. The child is born with a handicap that a later-born child would not have had; but of 
course the child that is born would not exist at all had its parents followed advice. So long as the 
child's life is at least barely worth living, the child has no grievance against its parents for their 
conduct. 
30. A baffling passage in Mill makes me hesitate to count him as in agreement. In Urn.ITA-
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How could this not be true? The "disagreeable consequences" of 
being disesteemed, unrecommended, shunned and passed over might 
conceivably be all that morality permits to be visited upon those who 
omit moral requirements. But Mill thought that where morally permis-
sible correction is so limited, what is at issue is not "social obligation" 
and that the correction itself does not express "moral disapprobation in 
the proper sense of the term." Unless a wholly self-concerning31 moral 
requirement is an intelligible possibility (which I doubt), it is difficult 
to understand how morality can both impose a genuine requirement of 
conduct and insulate the actor from the only independent means of 
knowing that and how her conduct varies from what is required. 
Working out such a hypothesis is not so very different from trying to 
imagine the world-view of a tribe, one of whose tabus is: Never correct 
what anyone says. Unless such a tribe were very lucky, its world-view 
would be hopelessly indeterminate even to itself.32 
I take it then that nothing can be a genuine moral requirement 
unless its omission is connected somehow with permissible suasion and 
remonstrance from sources other than the actor's conscience. Some 
other or others must therefore have a sufficient interest in what the 
RIANISM, he wrote: 
[T]he idea of a penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the 
conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong. We do not call anything 
wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or 
other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opin-
ion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. 
ld. at 303-04 (emphasis added). The concluding clause involves "a step of some magnitude," as 
H.L.A. Hart has noted. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in EsSAYS IN MoRAL PHILOSOPHY 
106-07 (A.I. Melden ed. 1958). Here, Mill may simply be adverting to linguistic evidence rather 
than to his own view. Mill elsewhere opines that the "internal sanction" of conscience is "not 
innate, but acquired," UTI LIT ARIANISM at 283, which suggests that he would have agreed 
that punishment by conscience is parasitic upon punishment by opinion. Mill may in fact have 
regarded the view I state here as too weak; for he seems to have believed that the performance of 
any genuine moral duty is compellable or, at least, that a person under a moral duty has no right 
to complain if she is compelled. See id. at 304. I would not go so far. 
31. I use the term "self-concerning duty" rather than the more familiar term, "self-regard-
ing duty" because the latter invites confusion. Clarity is served by replacing the latter with a pair 
of terms: a "self-concerning" duty is one whose omissions legitimately concerns no one other than 
the agent who is bound; a "self-directed" duty is one having as its aim the improvement of the 
actor or her lot, whether ultimately or as a means to an improved world, and whose omissions 
create no correlative grievance in any other person. The two concepts are distinct because others 
may have a legitimate concern even if none have a grievance. See note 29, supra, for an example. 
See generally Falk, Morality, Self, and Others, in MoRALITY AND THE LANGUAGE oF CoNDUCT 
25 (H.-N. Castaneda & G. Nakhnikian, eds. 1965) [hereinafter Falk]. The terminology proposed 
here makes it obvious that the existence of self-directed duties in no way guarantees that self-
concerning duties exist. 
32. This point echoes others made by philosophers as diverse as L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 94e-100e (B. McGuinness, trans. 3d ed. 1958), and G.W.F. HEGEL, 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND at 149-60 (J.B. Baillie, trans., rev. ed. 1931). 
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actor does to have a right to tell her what they think. Moreover, the 
suasion and remonstrance must be of a recognizably moral strain 
-they must be consistent with the assumption that they are licensed by 
the fact that a moral requirement of the actor is at issue. Therefore the 
"sufficient interest" on the others' part has to be understood as re-
stricted to a subset of their legitimate interests, i.e., to those interests 
that are implicated because the actor's performance of some moral re-
quirement is at stake. "Sufficient interest" does not encompass the 
larger set of legitimate interests containing what would suit the others' 
preferences on some other ground, or what would comport with the 
others' notions of what would merely be commendable. 
An example: suppose I am walking down the street and pass a 
blind man. He has dropped his cane and is groping for it. Although it 
would cost me nothing to help him, I step around him and over his 
cane and proceed on my way. I was observed at a distance by a person 
whom I now pass. If I was morally required to give assistance (as I 
think I obviously was) and the facts of the situation are evident to the 
onlooker, I think the onlooker is entitled to say something like this: "I 
saw what you did. It was rotten of you not to help. How would you 
like it if you were in his shoes? (or "What if everybody were as callous 
as you?")." Even if there is something amounting to a presumptive 
moral requirement not to offer unwelcome comment to strangers on the 
street, the onlooker acts properly if, but only if, the interest he takes is 
in my inexcusable omission of a moral requirement. He would, on the 
other hand, be a merely officious intermeddler if he were to say, "I saw 
what you did and I just didn't like it. It didn't please me at all. .. " or 
"Excuse me, but what you just did was hardly commendable. I don't 
mean that sarcastically, because I don't think you were morally re-
quired to do otherwise. You were, in fact, morally free to do what you 
did -but I don't commend you for it." 
I conclude that no moral requirement can exist outside a space of 
social enforcement. Wrongdoers sometimes manage to evade detection 
(think of the ring of Gyges in The Republic), but even so they violate a 
moral requirement just in case their conduct is of a type that is subject 
to social correction when detected. Of course there are limits to permis-
sible private suasion and chastisement, particularly where it is less than 
obvious what morality requires or whether a moral requirement is at 
issue. As David Falk put the point, "To say 'you ought to' to another is 
always a kind of interference; and the propriety of saying so (as distinct 
from having a judgment about it) varies with the case."33 For example, 
33. Falk, supra note 31 at 56 (emphasis in original). 
33] LAW AND MORALITY 43 
even those who think it obvious that a pregnant woman is morally re-
quired to take care to avoid doing harm to her unborn child would 
admit that they are constrained from offering unsolicited advice to her 
about her smoking or drinking. 34 In a case like this, comment can prop-
erly come only from those who are specially related to her -parent, 
sibling, child, doctor, spouse, lover or a close-enough friend. In the 
event that it is evident that no such person exists, or that such persons 
are unwilling to give counsel, then it seems less presumptuous of a 
stranger to comment. 
The existence of moral limits to permissible means of enforcement 
raises the question whether, within those limits, there is an additional 
moral limit that debars the state from employing the very same means 
available to some private person. This question is the subject of the 
following section. 
IV. ARE THERE MoRAL REQUIREMENTS WHosE PERMISSIBLE 
MEANS oF ENFORCEMENT ARE NoT AvAILABLE To THE STATE? 
Some moral requirements are coercively enforceable by suitably 
situated private persons. The law is shaped by a recognition that in 
some instances what would otherwise be a battery, or worse, is justifia-
ble by the fact that the would-be defendant acted to enforce a moral 
requirement, e.g., the moral requirement that the would-be complain-
ant refrain from violating the defendant's moral right to bodily integrity 
or property. This is sometimes explained by reference to what would be 
permissible in a state of nature. However we regard the matter, there 
are, I think, very few instances of privately coercively enforceable moral 
requirements that are not permissibly legally coercively enforceable. 
Here is a possible example: suppose that all children are morally re-
quired to obey their parents' reasonable bedtime rules, and suppose 
that this requirement is coercively enforceable by the parents. It could 
be argued that this requirement is strongly delegalized because legal 
intervention would violate moral principles that protect the integrity of 
the family. 
This example would be worrisome if it presented a genuine exam-
ple of a moral requirement, but I don't think it does. Children are 
relatively deficient in knowledge and judgment. This is why their par-
ents are entitled to make special rules for them until they are of "suit-
able age and discretion." But this very same immaturity makes it odd to 
say that children are morally required to follow these rules; a child 
does not breach a duty or ignore a moral obligation when it ignores 
34. I owe this example to Ferdie Schoenman. 
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them. Not everything that is permissibly coercively enforceable is a 
moral requirement incumbent upon the person who may permissibly 
be coerced. 
I can think of no significantly different examples, and so I con-
clude that any moral requirement that is coercively enforceable by a 
private person is permissibly enforceable by legal coercive means. The 
law exists, after all, to eliminate the hazards of a regime of private 
coercion, and the law achieves this end by presuming largely to monop-
olize the permissible means of coercive enforcement, as Hobbes and 
Locke explain. There are in fact many moral requirements that the 
state and only the state may permissibly enforce by coercion, e.g., pay-
ing taxes, ceasing public nuisances. 
Many moral requirements are not coercively enforceable by any 
private person. The blind man example above is a probable instance. 
The onlooker may permissibly chastise me, but he cannot lay hands on 
me, drag me back and force me to retrieve the blind man's cane. The 
question then becomes, are there suasive means of enforcement that the 
state may not permissibly pursue, even though some private person 
may? It seems to me that there are not, but the issue is obscured by the 
fact that the state rarely is in a position to offer personalized moral 
advice, and it seldom contents itself with doing so. Because the state 
cannot in principle occupy certain roles, such as spouse, parent or 
friend, its morally permissible suasive efforts seem to be seriously cur-
tailed. Therefore it will be worth exploring the question: Are there 
moral requirements which, though subject to permissible private sua-
sive enforcement, are not proper subjects of coercive legal enforcement? 
v. MANY GRADES OF LEGAL INVOLVEMENT 
Law affects conduct in multifarious ways. The paradigm instance 
of a legal requirement is a criminal statute that makes certain conduct 
punishable by imprisonment. But statutes impose fines as well as con-
finement, and taxes as well as fines. Paying these is a legal require-
ment. And the criminal law concerns not only what statutes prescribe, 
but also sentencing once a violation is proven. The defendant whose 
sentence may be enhanced for failure to show remorse after the fact is, 
in a perfectly natural sense, being legally required to show remorse. 311 
And the criminal law is not the whole of the law. Civil courts order 
contracts to be performed, property to be handed over, money to be 
paid, and children to be given up by their parents. To the extent that 
35. See Edmundson, Liberalism, Legal Decision making, and Morality 'As Such,' forthcom-
ing in 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (1990). 
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helping out with the dishes and abstaining from profanity can properly 
affect the result in a child custody suit, there is an attenuated sense in 
which these things are legally required. 
This messiness means that the delegalization thesis, that strongly 
delegalized moral requirements exist, can be held in various forms. A 
moderate form is the thesis that certain moral requirements cannot per-
missibly be enforced by the threat of imprisonment. An extreme form is 
the thesis that certain moral requirements are strongly delegalized "all 
the way down;" that is, certain moral requirements have no business 
affecting any legal outcome insofar as that outcome is coercively en-
forceable. I will explore the extreme and moderate views in turn. 
The extreme form of the thesis is not very plausible. What facts 
about a moral requirement would show that its affecting any legal re-
sult would violate a moral principle, i.e., some other moral require-
ment? Facts about individual autonomy and integrity come to mind. 
Consider the man who fails to help the blind man recover his cane. He 
acts selfishly and in a way that merits censure, one might argue, but 
visiting legal consequences would impermissibly impinge upon his au-
tonomy. This answer is unsatisfactory because it appeals to the very 
boundary that is at issue. Surely the man's conduct would be proper to 
consider in some legal contexts -such as a child custody proceeding or 
a parole hearing- and if considered it might very well determine the 
outcome. 
Another example: the expectant mother who smokes and drinks 
despite the risks to her unborn child. A defender of the extreme view 
could argue that just as a stranger could not properly comment on her 
conduct, the state may not attach consequences to it. This position ap-
peals to an analogy between the state and the officious intermeddler, 
while implicitly rejecting analogies between the state and those in spe-
cial roles, such as the physician. Unless this selective use of analogy can 
be supported, it is question begging. Such support seems unlikely, and 
in any case it is implausible to suggest that the woman's conduct could 
not permissibly be taken into account in deciding, e.g., her fitness to be 
a custodial parent or her entitlement to recover damages against a to-
bacco company or distiller for injuries to her own health. Of course the 
weight such facts should be given in isolation may be slight, but it is 
hard to imagine a moral barrier to their being weighed at all that is not 
also a barrier to thinking them contrary to a moral requirement. 
The extreme position is defensible only if at least one of the fol-
lowing two propositions is true: a) legal correction is per se oppressive 
of liberty in a way that private correction is not, or b) legal correction, 
though not different in kind from private correction, is in fact always 
more oppressive. But neither is true. Legal correction can be very mild. 
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The "lingering death" imposed for various offenses in imperial China 
stands at the opposite extreme from, for example, the $5 parking ticket 
or the 5 mil sales tax. But each is an example of an exaction imposed 
by a legal system, a legal requirement. Moral suasion and remon-
strance, on the other hand, can be very harsh. The sermon on hell in A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is a good example of the ex-
tremes to which moral suasion can be carried, and The Scarlet Letter of 
the extreme possibilities of remonstrance. 88 I find it difficult to believe 
that imposing a fine of $5 for each failure to render aid to the blind 
man in circumstances like those described is inherently more offensive 
to one's liberty, integrity or privacy than the suasion and remonstrance 
that is licensed in virtue of the fact that one has acted contrary to a 
moral requirement. A violator might well prefer to pay the $5 and be 
spared the "moral reprobation . . . retribution and punishment" of 
which Mill spoke. 
It could be argued that legal correction fails to respect the agent as 
an autonomous being, unlike private suasive correction, which essen-
tially constitutes an appeal to the agent in her capacity as rational 
chooser. This argument proves too much if it means that the threat of 
legal correction precludes free choice. Anyone who has ever driven on a 
highway knows this to be false. Moreover, it is unclear why a criminal 
statute cannot be understood to be both an appeal to the citizen's moral 
sense and a threat. As Mill points out, moral suasion may involve 
"moral reprobation ... retribution and punishment," without ceasing 
to be an appeal to us in our capacity as rational actors. 
Perhaps it could be argued that although the fine may not be so 
oppressive as to preclude free choice, it is inherently more objectionable 
than suasion because the actor cannot exercise virtue -or act morally 
in a Kantian sense- by complying with the threat the fine represents. 
But this argument assumes that an actor's conduct is morally worthy 
only to the extent that her choice is unaffected (consciously or other-
wise) by its consequences for her. If that is so, why should it matter 
whether the constraining consequences are legal or merely social in 
nature? 
Mill's observation about social enforcement bears repeating here: 
although merely moral requirements are "not usually upheld by such 
extreme penalties" as legal requirements are, private suasive enforce-
36. Hester Prynne was of course legally required to wear the scarlet letter but, in itself, the 
letter was only marginally more burdensome than the garment to which it was sewn. The efficacy 
of legal punishment depended on its stimulating private means of enforcement that would in per-
haps lesser degree have been used anyway. There are indications in the text that the legal punish-
ment forestalled even more drastic private measures. 
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ment "leaves fewer means of escape, penetrat[es] much more deeply 
into the details of life, and enslav[es] the soul itself." These differences 
can be explained. If we consider the perceived extremity of a sanction 
to be equal to its actual extremity discounted by the probability the 
actor assigns to its occurrence, any given degree of perceived extremity 
can be attained either by combining a low probability of "conviction" 
with an extreme penalty, or by combining a higher probability of con-
viction with a lesser penalty. Social rather than legal enforcement may 
be attractive because it combines relatively low administrative costs 
(e.g., police, courts, etc.) with a relatively high probability of conviction. 
Thus, social enforcement may not only deliver a given level of perceived 
extremity of sanction at a lower administrative cost, it may do so by 
employing less extreme penalties. 37 
Mill points out that private suasive correction is not only intrusive, 
it can erode the spontaneity of individual choice more surely and more 
extensively than any concern on the agent's part to avoid mild or re-
mote legal consequences. There are of course moral and even legal lim-
its to the extent and nature of suasive correction. Officious intermed-
dling is morally impermissible, and suasion or remonstrance that lapses 
into harangue or harassment is also impermissible. But, at least as to 
the latter, these limits are diffuse and wide. No matter how much we 
may relish abstract discussion, only the sturdiest and most self-certain 
of us are likely to remain unmoved and unbothered by the more strenu-
ous forms of permissible suasion and complaint where our actual, im-
pending or completed practical decisions are at issue. 
Mill held that private suasive correction, unlike legal repression, 
can "enslav[e] the soul itself." We can understand this as a reminder 
that the boundary between self and state is much harder to confound 
than the boundary between soul and soulmates. Heretics, for example, 
so typically form subcultures in which heresy is orthodoxy that it is 
reasonable to view such associations as practically necessary to the very 
maintenance of heresy. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how an individ-
ual could, without lapsing into pathology, persevere in any course of 
37. For a discussion of the dynamics of the choice between public and private enforcement 
through the legal system, and of the factors that govern the choice between different combinations 
of severity and probability to achieve a given expected cost to the criminal, see R. PosNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 7, 22 (3d ed. 1986). Posner argues that the problem of the insolvent 
defendant largely accounts for the great degree to which criminal law relies on nonpecuniary 
penal sanctions rather than tort remedies to achieve its ends. See id. at 205, 209, and cf Becker & 
Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1975) (proposing that criminal prosecution be wholly private). For an historical account of a 
regime combining extreme penalties and private prosecution, see D. HAY, P. LINEBAUGH, J. 
RULE, E. THOMPSON & C. WINSLOW, ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHT-
EENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1975). 
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conduct that was universally thought wicked, whether or not it was 
illegal. Pace Kant and Rawls, we are not noumenal egos. We know 
ourselves through our associations and our understandings of how we 
are as others know us. 88 A barrier to legal correction alone would leave 
the individual's identity, as well as her liberty, exposed to potentially 
devastating social assaults. 
Following Mill, we can conceptualize every instance of social con-
trol as an ordered quadruple whose values are a severity measure, an 
avoidability measure, a pervasiveness measure and a measure of the 
effect upon individuality. These measures are comparable and additive 
(let's pretend) and yield a measure of the total burden upon liberty of 
any given means of social control. Typically, civil penalties exceed pri-
vate suasive methods in the severity measure, but not in the others. On 
Mill's view, then, for any private suasive means of enforcement there 
exists a conceivable, less burdensome state-imposed coercive means. 
Therefore, if Mill is generally correct, there will always be a possible, 
state-imposed coercive means of enforcement that is less offensive, on 
balance, than any given private, suasive means. 
Legal correction is often less intrusive than the least intrusive 
morally permissible, available form of private suasive correction. Sup-
pose I am driving on a public highway with my young children. I am 
driving carelessly but cause no actual harm, and suppose my driving 
this way violates a moral requirement. Suppose that another private 
person observes my driving and perceives that it created a sufficiently 
great risk of harm to him to give him a moral permission to complain, 
to me, about it. In these circumstances the least intrusive suasive correc-
tion available to him might be something like following me, catching up 
with me, waving me over and complaining -politely- about my driv-
ing; in others words, doing what the nicest police officer would do in 
the circumstances. My suspicion is that most of us would find this con-
siderably more galling than being cautioned or even ticketed by the po-
lice. And more than galling -humiliating, infuriating, baffling and 
discombobulating. In a word -intrusive.39 
VI. Is CRIMINAL PuNISHMENT DIFFERENT? FEINBERG's VIEw 
The extreme view seems untenable, but the moderate view may 
not be. The extreme view is vulnerable because it forbids any legal 
38. On this subject, see generally M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THf: LIMITS OF jUSTICE 
(1982). 
39. A popular automobile bumper-sticker reads: "Don't like my driving? Dial 1-800-EAT-
SHIT." The idea behind this might be translated: "If my driving isn't bad enough to call forth 
legal correction, then no one has a right to complain about it." 
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consequence to attach to certain forms of immoral conduct. The moder-
ate view does not forbid all legal consequences to attach, but only those 
of a certain type, i.e., imprisonment or corporal or capital punishment. 
The moderate view thus seems more reasonable; after all, imprison-
ment seems importantly different from other burdens that the state may 
impose on us. But, looking behind this appearance, what separates reg-
ulation from punishment? Unless some principled distinction between 
regulation and criminalization can be drawn, every example of permis-
sible regulatory enforcement of a moral requirement is a problem for 
the moderate version of the delegalization thesis. 
Joel Feinberg offers a principled basis for such a distinction in his 
essay, "The Expressive Function of Punishment."40 According to Fein-
berg, punishment needs to be understood as distinct from mere penalty. 
Penalties include such things as "parking tickets, offside penalties, 
sackings, flunkings and disqualifications" while "imprisonment at hard 
labor for committing a felony" is an example of a punishment."1 Fein-
berg rejects the idea that the distinction can rest on severity alone, even 
though penalties typically are the less severe; and he rejects the idea 
that penalties can be characterized as "retroactive licensing fees" in 
contrast to punishments, which are not."2 Rather, Feinberg differenti-
ates the genus of "authoritative deprivations for failures" -to which 
both punishments and penalties belong- according to an "important 
additional characteristic" common and peculiar to punishments."3 This 
40. Collected in j. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING at 95-118 (1970) [hereinafter "The 
Expressive Function"]. 
41. /d. at 96. 
42. /d. at 97. Robert Cooter points out that the difference between prices and sanctions 
(roughly, between penalties and punishments, in Feinberg's terminology) can also be understood 
in terms of effect. See Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Cot.UM. L. REv. 1523 (1984). Sanctions 
typically increase in abrupt fashion as the actor passes from a permitted to a forbidden level of 
activity, whereas prices do not. If in Mill's time governments were generally more given to sanc-
tioning than to pricing, then his observation that legal requirements are typically upheld by "more 
extreme penalties" can be understood as referring not only to the relative severity of legal enforce-
ment, but also to the fact that the abruptness with which the law responds to incremental in-
creases in activity level stands in contrast to the more continuous nature of social enforcement. We 
are capable of expressing social disapprobation in nearly continuous fashion -think of the gradu-
ally raised eyebrow- whereas legal sanctions (as opposed to prices) tend to jump at one in a more 
extreme-seeming (because abrupt) way. 
43. "The Expressive Function" at 97-98. Feinberg rightly dismisses the idea that the distinc-
tion between punishments and penalties can be based on degree of severity. See id. at 96. In a 
similar vein, David Luban dismisses the idea that the law can consistently grant an indigent a 
right to appointed counsel in a criminal case while denying her a right to appointed counsel in 
civil litigation. See D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE at 261-62 (1988). Such a difference cannot 
be justified, Luban argues, by appeal to any presumed primacy of physical liberty over pecuniary 
interests. /d. at 262. 
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characteristic is what Feinberg calls "a certain expressive function.""" 
Punishment, he argues, "is a conventional device for the expression of 
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disap-
proval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority 
himself [sic] or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.""1 
If Feinberg can establish that a criminal legal requirement is 
backed by a threat (viz. of punishment, rather than mere penalty) that 
is different in kind from what backs a merely regulatory legal require-
ment, then there is a way to maintain the moderate version of the dele-
galization thesis. The advocate of the moderate view will admit that 
moral requirements may permissibly become regulatory legal require-
ments, but she will deny that all moral requirements may permissibly 
become criminal legal requirements. She will be able to do this by ex-
ploiting the discontinuity between penalties and punishments. She will 
admit that for each private suasive enforcement measure there exists a 
possible, less oppressive regulatory legal enforcement measure; but she 
will deny that there always exists a possible, less oppressive criminal 
legal enforcement measure. She can do this because every criminal legal 
enforcement measure will carry a special characteristic not shared by 
its otherwise equally severe regulatory counterparts -namely, the sym-
bolic stigma. 
Can this work? It is true that regulatory legal requirements do not 
generally independently constitute moral requirements, and it is true 
that to add a "symbolic stigma" to what would otherwise be a mere 
regulatory offense (a mere malum prohibitum) is to attach a conse-
quence different in kind from mere penalty. But the delegalization the-
sis concerns types of conduct that are supposed already to be morally 
required, and whose omission is therefore already necessarily stigma-
tized. And so what criminalizing the omission of a moral requirement 
adds is not indignation or a judgment that a type of conduct is morally 
wrong, for those must already_ have existed. 
Criminalizing the omission of a moral requirement changes two 
things. It creates a coercive remedy where, possibly, no morally permis-
sible private coercive remedy had existed. And it expresses the state's 
remonstrance in addition to the necessarily permissible private remon-
strance that otherwise exists. The first change is not necessarily differ-
ent from the change that would be brought about by regulating the 
omission, and there is reason to doubt that any moral requirement can 
44. "The Expressive Function" at 98. 
45. /d. Mill argued that "the chief mischief of the legal penalties [imposed on unpopular 
belief] is that they strengthen the social stigma ... which is [what is J really effective .... " ON 
LIBERTY at 39. 
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be morally immune from regulatory enforcement. The second change 
adds to -but does not originate- the category of those who may per-
missibly remonstrate with the offender for his omission. Therefore the 
necessary minimum net difference between regulating and criminaliz-
ing is the addition of the state to the category of those who may permis-
sibly remonstrate. The moderate version of the delegalization thesis is 
tenable only if it is plausible to hold that there is a moral principle that 
makes it impermissible for the state to remonstrate about the omission 
of some (but of course not all) moral requirements. 
The inquiry has come full circle. Above, at the end of section IV, I 
suggested that because particularized state suasive enforcement is often 
unavailable, it would be necessary to examine whether the state could 
permissibly enforce, by its typically coercive mechanisms, moral re-
quirements that no private person was free to enforce coercively. In 
section V, I gave an affirmative answer to this question with respect to 
regulatory coercion, leaving only the question whether there are princi-
pled grounds to believe that criminal punishment cannot be employed 
to enforce at least some moral requirements. Now, it appears that the 
search for an answer to this question returns us to the earlier one: Is it 
ever morally improper for the state suasively to enforce a moral 
requirement? 
Above, I noted that the class of those who may permissibly remon-
strate with a person about her omission of a moral requirement is 
sometimes limited. I also suggested, though, that circumstances may op-
erate to open this class; for example, when no one occupies the roles 
that ordinarily carry such a permission. Like it or not, we see that the 
state is often the only dependable inheritor of these roles when -as 
increasingly happens- they fall vacant. Their having responsible te-
nants is at best a contingent matter, and the circumstance that they 
often do have responsible tenants cannot be a basis for strongly delegal-
izing any moral requirement. 
There is no denying that criminal punishments are typically more 
severe than regulatory penalties, and typically more burdensome upon 
liberty than private suasive enforcement measures. But it is likewise 
true that private coercive enforcement is more severe than suasion. A 
perhaps nebulous idea of proportionality governs both legal and private 
enforcement. The moderate version of the delegalization thesis is inter-
esting only if it holds that some moral requirement enforceable by pri-
vate means of overall burdensomeness b is not enforceable by criminal 
legal means having an overall burdensomeness of b or less; but holding 
this seems unreasonable. The moderate version cannot be defended by 
appealing to the fact that we would object to the state's locking up the 
petty malefactor and throwing away the key; we would likewise object 
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to any private person's doing this. What counts is what others do to the 
individual and, as Mill saw, whether what is done is done privately or 
by law makes no fundamental difference. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the pluralistic, complicated and increasingly fragmented world 
we inhabit, there are good reasons to refer to the state a greater-than-
traditional share of the task of moral correction. For one thing, private 
correction is less reliable than it may have been when ties of family, 
religion and community were stronger. For another, private correction 
can be irregular, unfair, scary, risky and invasive. State responsibility 
for moral oversight may on balance be to the benefit of those overseen; 
whether it is or is not cannot be settled a priori. 
Mill's fears of social tyranny have not, in the United States at 
least, been realized.46 What Mill did not and perhaps could not foresee 
was the degree to which mobility and urbanization have eroded the 
bases both of social enforcement and of the reflective consensus that 
moral requirements presuppose. To the extent that social tyranny ap-
pears less of a threat than Mill envisaged, legal tyranny appears more 
of one. This fact has made it tempting to recast Mill's doctrine as one 
defining the limits of law alone, or of criminal law alone, rather than a 
limit to social control generally. I have tried to show that this is a 
mistake. 
To grant that something is a moral requirement is to authorize 
some means of social enforcement. To those of us who find popular 
notions of morality too narrow, it may be tempting to ignore the 
"moral" point in order to concentrate our forces at the perimeter of the 
law. This gambit leaves the legitimacy of social enforcement unchal-
lenged, but the thought may be that this can be readily evaded; and that 
the cost of contesting the moral territory is too high. However sound 
this might be as a forensic strategy, I think it is untenable in theory. 
It is easy to picture morality divided into an outer sphere and an 
inner sphere. Morality is not offended if the state helps police the outer 
sphere, but the inner sphere is another matter. The law cannot enter 
here; morality itself forbids it, and forbids it absolutely, not as a mere 
matter of policy. This is a powerful, if inaccurate, picture. Because of 
its power, it is hard to resist using this image when the legislature 
threatens to penalize what is morally innocent. Appealing to this pic-
ture may help block bad legislation while finessing the politically very 
46. As Sir Isaiah Berlin tersely puts it, "Mill had scarcely any prophetic gift." FouR EssAYS 
ON LIBERTY 183 (1970). 
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bloody debate about what is and is not morally blameworthy. The per-
fect coincidence view rejects this seductive and expedient picture. It 
may be that the perfect coincidence view should remain an esoteric doc-
trine -rather as Sidgwick thought utilitarianism should be- until the 
passions the privacy debate has stirred recede. 
